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Presumed Consent Organ Donation in
Pennsylvania: One Small Step for
Pennsylvania, One Giant Leap for Organ

Donation
Samantha A. Wilcox*
Give my sight to [a] man who has never seen [the moon] .... Take
my bones, every muscle, every fiber and nerve in my body andfind a
way to make a crippledchild walk....

Robert N. Test, To Remember Me1
I.

Introduction: Harrisburg, We Have a Problem

As of October 19, 2001, the names of approximately 78,530 people
appeared on the United Network for Organ Sharing ("UNOS") waiting
list. 2 These 78,530 people await hearts, lungs, livers, kidneys and
pancreases: organs vital to carrying on the type of lifestyle many
Americans consider normal.3 Approximately 13,437 names on the list
are from UNOS Region 2, which includes Pennsylvania, Delaware, the
District of Columbia, Maryland, New Jersey, and West Virginia. 4 To put
the numbers in perspective, in 1999 there were only 10,570 donors
nationwide (5872 of which were cadavers) with only 808 from UNOS
Region 2. 5 The numbers for 2000 are even grimmer for Pennsylvania
residents. Although the number of donors nationwide increased to
11,584 (5984 of which were cadavers), the number of donors from
*
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1. ROBERT TEST, To REMEMBER ME (1980).
2. United
Network
for
Organ
Sharing,
Critical
Data,
http://www.unos.org/Frame default.asp?Category-Newsdata (last modified Oct.
2001) [hereinafter United Network for Organ Sharing, CriticalData].
3. See id.
4. Id.

5.

Id.

at
19,
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UNOS Region 2 dropped to 761.6
These numbers are cause for concern for two reasons. First, UNOS
gives preference to recipients in the donor's locality and UNOS region
before matching organs with recipients nationwide.7 With roughly 800
donors a year, the 13,437 people currently on the waiting list in UNOS
Region 2 will have to rely on a lack of recipients in other UNOS regions,
an unlikely occurrence considering that 78,530 people nationwide are
currently awaiting organ donations. 8 Second, in 1999 and 2000
combined, approximately 260,000 Pennsylvania residents, and potential
donors, died. 9 A single donor can save the lives of four people (a heart,
two lungs, and a liver), improve the lives of five more people (two
kidneys, a pancreas, and two corneas), and benefit the lives of many
more (bone, skin, and tissue). 10 If all of Pennsylvania's decedents had
been organ donors, they could have met the needs of the entire nation.
This comment seeks to increase awareness of the organ shortage,
but, more importantly, it argues for the implementation of a presumed
consent law. Part II explores organ donation in Pennsylvania and the
success of presumed consent laws abroad. Part III argues that presumed
consent is only a small step for Pennsylvania by emphasizing the
similarity between a presumed consent law and other Pennsylvania
statutes, by demonstrating that neither the Federal nor the Pennsylvania
Constitution bars the "importation" of a presumed consent law from
abroad, and by reminding readers that Pennsylvania has been a pioneer in
pro-organ donation legislation in the past. Part IV concludes that
presumed consent in Pennsylvania would be a giant leap for organ
donation.
II.

Background: Exploring Organ Donation in Pennsylvania and
Abroad

The time has come to explore new means of organ donation." As
of the last major survey, seventy-five percent of Americans supported

6. Id.
7. United
Network
for
Organ
Sharing,
About
UNOS,
at
http://www.unos.org/framedefault.asp? Category=About (last modified June 1999)
[hereinafter United Network for Organ Sharing, About UNOS].
8. United Network for Organ Sharing, CriticalData, supra note 2.
9.

PA. DEP'TOF HEALTH, PENNSYLVANIA VITAL STATISTICS 2000 (2001).

10. Melissa N. Kumit, Note, Organ Donation in the United States: Can We Learn
from Success Abroad?, 17 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 405, 408 (1994) (citing J.G.
Turcotte, Supply Demand and Ethics of Organ Procurement: The Medical Perspective,
24 TRANSPLANTATION PROCEEDINGS 2140, 2141 (1992)).
11. "Organ" as used throughout this comment means organs, tissues, eyes, bones,
arteries, blood, fluid, or any other body part. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8601 (2001).
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organ donation but only seventeen percent carried donor cards. 12 This
indicates that Pennsylvania's current voluntary, or opt-in, approach to
organ donation has failed to recruit a sufficient number of potential
donors.' 3 Meanwhile, the presumed consent laws abroad have been
successful at increasing the number of organ donors. 14
A.

CurrentLegislation in Pennsylvania

Organ donation in Pennsylvania is governed by both federal and
state statutes.15 In 1972, Pennsylvania adopted the Uniform Anatomical
Gift Act of 1968 ("UAGA"). 16
Under this opt-in approach, an
affirmative choice to donate must be made. 17 Individuals can indicate
their desire to donate in a will, living will, durable power of attorney, or
other written document.' 8 Individuals can also donate by affirmatively
answering the question presented when obtaining or renewing a driver's
license. 19 Additionally, an individual's "next of kin" can choose to
donate the decedent's organs at death.20

12. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT note (amended 1987), 8A U.L.A. 20.
13. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8611; United Network for Organ Sharing, Critical
Data, supra note 2 (stating that only 761 organ donors were recovered from UNOS
Region 2 in 1999 and only 808 in 2000); sources cited supra note 9 (stating that
approximately 129,000 potential Pennsylvania donors died in 1999, and approximately
130,000 died in 2000).
14. See Symposium, The United States System of Organ Donation, the International
Solution, and the CadavericOrgan Donor Act: "And the Winner Is... ," 20 J. CORP. L.
5, 22-25 (1995); Kumit, supra note 10, at 442-44.
15. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8611-8622. In 1984, Congress passed the National
Organ Transplant Act ("NOTA"), which also affects organ donation in Pennsylvania.
National Organ Transplant Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-507, 98 Stat. 2339 (codified as
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 273-274 (2001)). Only § 274e, which prohibits the sale of
organs, see 42 U.S.C. § 274e, is relevant to this comment and is discussed in Part III.D.
See infra note 127.
16. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8601-8641. All fifty states and the District of Columbia
adopted the UAGA of 1968. UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT note (amended 1987), 8A
U.L.A. 20. Twenty-three states, excluding Pennsylvania, adopted the UAGA as amended
in 1987. Id. (Supp. 2001).
17. Any individual that is eighteen years of age or older can choose to become an
organ donor. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8611. Individuals between the ages of sixteen and
seventeen can choose to become organ donors provided that they have parental consent.
Id. Only the next of kin can choose to donate the organs of a decedent under the age of
sixteen. See id.
18. Id. § 8613.
19. Id.§ 8619.
20. Id. § 8611 (permitting donation by a spouse, adult child, parent, adult sibling, or
guardian, in that order of preference). In this comment, "next of kin" will be used so as
to include the spouse of the decedent in addition to the decedent's blood relatives.
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B. PresumedConsent Abroad
A presumed consent or opt-out method of organ donation is the
opposite of Pennsylvania's opt-in method. Under a presumed consent
method, individuals automatically become organ donors at death unless
they opted-out during their lifetime.2" Under a strong form of presumed
consent the wishes of family members are not considered.22 A weak
form of presumed consent, on the other hand, allows next of kin to
object, but no effort is made to seek out and determine their wishes.2 3
Presumed consent legislation abroad has successfully increased the
number of available organs.2 4 Organ donation increased in France and
25
Belgium after the implementation of a weak form of presumed consent.
France ranked sixth among European countries in cadaver donors after
implementation of a presumed consent law; 26 and, in Belgium, kidney

donation increased 86% and overall organ donation increased 183% after
implementation of presumed consent legislation.27
The results of presumed consent in France and Belgium, although
successful, have been less positive than the results obtained in countries
that have implemented stronger forms of presumed consent.2 8 In Austria,
all individuals are presumed to be organ donors at death unless a written
objection accompanies the body.29 Physicians do not ask for family
consent and have no duty to look for documented objections that do not
accompany the body. 30 Not surprisingly, Austria has the highest rate of
cadaver donors with fifty-seven donors per million population each
year. 31 Similarly, Singapore has a strong "partial" presumed consent law
under which all individuals are considered kidney donors at death unless
32
they opted-out during their lifetime by signing a written objection form.
After the law was implemented, the number of kidneys increased from
21. See Symposium, supra note 14, at 21-22.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. See id. at 22-25; Kurnit, supra note 10, at 442-45.
25. Symposium, supra note 14, at 23; Kumit, supra note 10, at 421-22. But see id.
at 444 (suggesting that the increase in organ donors in Belgium may be the result of
increased hospital participation in organ donation).
26. Kurnit, supra note 10, at 442.
27. Id. at 444.
28. Symposium, supra note 14, at 22-23, 25.

29.

Id. at 22.

30. Id.; Kumit, supra note 10, at 423.
31. Symposium, supra note 14, at 22; Kumit, supra note 10, at 445. But see id. at
445 (suggesting that Austria's high rate of donors may be the result of the very active

transplant teams in the country).
32. Symposium, supra note 14, at 25 (stating that Muslims are exempt from the law
for religious reasons and must opt-in to become organ donors); see also Kurnit, supra

note 10, at 425.
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approximately five per year to thirty-one per year."
Similar to Singapore's presumed consent legislation involving
kidneys, several states within the United States have implemented
successful "partial" presumed consent laws involving corneas and
pituitary glands.34 Florida enacted a presumed consent cornea donation
statute in 1977 that increased donation from five hundred corneas in
1976, to over three thousand in 1985. 35 Similarly, Georgia enacted a
presumed consent cornea donation statute in 1978 that increased
donation from twenty-five per year before 1978, to over one thousand
per year by 1984.36 Based on its success abroad and the positive data on
domestic partial presumed consent laws, Pennsylvania should develop a
strong form of presumed consent organ donation.
It would be misleading to suggest that presumed consent legislation
has yielded nothing but positive results. Critics have suggested that the
positive results obtained in France, Belgium, Austria, and Singapore are
attributable to alternative sources, such as increased hospital
participation, more active transplant teams, and public education
campaigns. 37 Additionally, some European countries returned to opt-in
methods of organ donation after presumed consent laws had proven
burdensome to citizens and had failed to remedy the organ shortage.38
However, given the current organ shortage, any increase, no matter how
slight, would be beneficial, and presumed consent should not be
discounted merely because of difficulties in establishing causation.
III.

Analysis: One Small Step for Pennsylvania

A presumed consent law would represent only a small step beyond
the statutes already in place in Pennsylvania. Presumed consent organ
donation is similar to Pennsylvania's intestacy laws governing the
disposition of property at death and Pennsylvania's partial presumed
33. Symposium, supra note 14, at 25. But see Kumit, supra note 10, at 424-25
(suggesting that the increased number of kidneys may be the result of Singapore's public
education campaign).
34. See Linda C. Fentiman, Organ Donation as a National Service: A Proposed
Federal Organ Donation Law, 27 SUFFOLK L. REV. 1593, 1599 n.38 (1993) (listing the
partial presumed consent statutes of the several states); see also Kumit, supra note 10, at
420 (stating that these statutes vary from strong to weak forms with some requiring a
reasonable effort to obtain consent from the next of kin while others do not require any
effort to obtain consent from the next of kin).
35. State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1191 (Fla. 1986).
36. Ga. Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga. 1985).
Pennsylvania also has such a law but in a weak form, requiring a reasonable effort to
contact the next of kin. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8641 (2001).
37. See supra notes 25, 31, 33.
38. Symposium, supra note 14, at 35; Theodore Silver, The Casefor a Post-Mortem
Organ Draft and a ProposedModel Organ Draft Act, 68 B.U. L. REv. 681, 706 (1988).
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consent law for cornea donation. 39 These existing laws have faced little
resistance from Pennsylvania citizens, and the challenges to partial
presumed consent statutes of other states seem to indicate that the United
States Constitution does not bar "importing" a presumed consent law into
Pennsylvania. 40 Further, Pennsylvania has been a pioneer in the area of
pro-organ donation legislation in the past and should not be afraid to
continue to lead the nation in this area. 4'
A.

The Similarity to Intestate DistributionsofProperty

Sections 2101 to 2110 of Title 20 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated
Statutes create a default system of property distribution for a decedent
who failed to opt-out of the statute by creating a will. 42 Section 2102

divides the decedent's estate between his or her spouse, issue, and
parents.4 3 Section 2103 creates a hierarchy of individuals to receive the
decedent's property, in the absence of a spouse, issue, or parent, which
ultimately ends with the decedent's property escheating to the
Commonwealth. 44 Section 2101 allows the decedent, by executing a will
prior to death, to exclude or limit the succession rights of the individuals
listed in sections 2102 and 2103. 45 None of these statutory provisions
has been successfully challenged on constitutional grounds.46
Although a decedent's body is not part of his or her estate and is not
subject to the intestacy statutes, 47 the intestacy statutes are comparable to
a presumed consent law. Initially, one major distinction between the
intestacy laws and a presumed consent organ donation law must be
noted: something must be done with the decedent's estate, but nothing
must be done with the decedent's organs. Real and personal property
must go to someone to prevent it from sitting forever useless each time a
39.

See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2102-2103, 8641.

40. See discussion infra Part llI.C.
41. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8621-8622; Laurel R. Siegel, Comment, ReEngineering the Laws of Organ Transplantation,49 EMORY L.J. 917, 941-43 (2000)
(discussing Pennsylvania's unique benefits system that rewards organ donors).
42. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 2101-2110. Only sections 2101 to 2103 are relevant to
the discussion in this comment.
43. Id. § 2102 (stating that all of the decedent's property goes to the surviving
spouse if no issue or parent of the decedent is alive, and if the decedent's issue and/or
parents are alive, a portion of the decedent's property goes to the surviving spouse, issue,
and/or parents).
44. Id. § 2103 (stating that when the decedent does not have a surviving spouse the
property passes, in the following order, to (1) issue, (2) parents, (3) siblings or nieces and
nephews, (4) grandparents, (5) uncles, aunts, grandchildren, and cousins, or (6) the
Commonwealth).
45. Id. § 2101.
46. Seeid. §§ 2101-2103.
47. See, e.g., Moyer v. Moyer, 577 P.2d 108, 110 (Utah 1978).
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decedent fails to distribute it in a will. In contrast, nothing has to be
done with a decedent's organs. The organs could simply remain in the
decedent's body.
Despite this distinction, Pennsylvania's intestacy statutes and
presumed consent organ donation are similar. First, one can analogize
the need to keep property in use with the need to keep organs in use
given the current organ shortage. Second, both laws establish a default
system of distributing the decedent's "property, 48 at death and both laws
allow the decedent to opt-out of the default system prior to death. Under
the intestacy statutes the decedent can opt-out of the default property
distribution system by preparing a will. 49 Similarly, under a presumed
consent law the decedent can opt-out of the default organ donation
system by objecting during his or her lifetime.50
B.

The Similarity to Presumed Consent CorneaDonation

Section 8641 of Title 20 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes
allows a coroner or medical examiner to presume that a decedent is a
donor and to remove the decedent's corneas, provided that certain
conditions are met. 51 The statute requires that the decedent die under
circumstances leading to a medical examiner or coroner inquest, that an
eye bank make a request for the corneas, that the coroner or medical
examiner make a reasonable effort but fail to contact the next of kin, that
the coroner or medical examiner not know of any objection to the
donation, and that the cornea removal not alter the decedent's facial
appearance. 52
The "partial" presumed consent of section 8641 is comparable to a
"complete" presumed consent law.
First, similar to the presumed
consent cornea donation under section 8641, a complete presumed
consent law operates on the presumption that individuals will donate
needed organs.53 Although section 8641 establishes a presumption in
favor of cornea donation only when the body is subject to an autopsy and

48. For purposes of this comparison, "property" under the intestacy statutes refers to
all of the decedent's real and personal probate property, while in the context of a

presumed consent law it is used more loosely to refer to the decedent's organs (even if
they are not constitutional property as debated in Part III.C).
49.

20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 2101.

50. Opportunities to opt-out could be presented when obtaining or renewing a
driver's license, filing an income tax return, applying for unemployment, registering to
vote, visiting the doctor, or applying for any type of insurance. Fentiman, supra note 34,
at 1600; Kurnit, supra note 10, at 449.
51.
52.
53.

20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8641.

Id.
See id.
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under the authority of a coroner or medical examiner,5 4 a complete
presumed consent law would take the next step and presume donation of
all organs under all circumstances. Unlike section 8641, a presumed
consent law would not require an effort to contact the next of kin because
the next of kin are not permitted to object under a strong form of
presumed consent.55
Second, the two laws are similar in their requirement of a need for
the organ. Like the required request by an eye bank under section
8641,56 a presumed consent law would require that a need for the organs
exists before they may be harvested from the decedent. If an organ bank
does not need a particular organ or the organ is not suitable for
transplantation, it will remain in the decedent's body. 57 However, the
current need for organs is high and it is likely that many organs will be
removed. 8
Although section 8641 and a presumed consent law are similar, it is
the differences between the two that strengthen the argument in favor of
complete presumed consent. Section 8641 is based on the presumption
that all individuals are cornea donors, regardless of the donor's age. 59 A
complete presumed consent law, on the other hand, affects only
individuals eighteen years of age and older-individuals old enough to
make an informed decision as to whether or not to opt-out themselves.60
Second, section 8641 does not offer an opportunity for individuals
to opt-out of the presumed cornea donation themselves.6' If the decedent
meets the requirements of section 8641, the corneas are automatically
donated. A complete presumed consent law, on the other hand, provides
individuals with several opportunities to opt-out of the system
themselves during their lifetime.62
Finally, section 8641 does not require public education about the
program, and it is likely that a majority of Pennsylvania residents are

54.
55.
56.

Id.
See Symposium, supra note 14, at 21-22.
20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8641.

57. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8611, 8616 (allowing a donation facility to determine
the medical acceptability of the organ and accept or reject the gift).
58. See United Network for Organ Sharing, CriticalData,supra note 2.
59. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8641 (failing to state a minimum age requirement);
see, e.g., Ga. Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 128 (Ga. 1985) (involving

parents who unsuccessfully challenged the removal of their infant's corneas under
Georgia's presumed consent cornea donation statute).
60. Individuals under the age of eighteen would be subject to the current system of
consent by the next of kin. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8611.
61.

See id. § 8641 (failing to indicate a method for excepting oneself from the

statute).
62.

See supra note 50.
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unaware that the statute even exists. 63 A complete presumed consent law
would require public education about the system and the varying ways to
opt-out. 64
Given the benefits of complete presumed consent,
Pennsylvania should be willing to consider such a law as its next step.
C.

The Lack of a ConstitutionalBar

The caselaw on partial presumed consent statutes of other states
provides the best analysis of whether a complete presumed consent law
in Pennsylvania would violate federal or state constitutional rights.
Some caselaw suggests that no constitutional rights are abridged under a
presumed consent law. 65 Moreover, the cases finding that such rights are
affected by a presumed consent law suggest that those rights can be
sufficiently protected to satisfy constitutional requirements.6 6
Potential constitutional challenges to a presumed consent law may
be founded on the property and privacy rights protected by both the
United States Constitution and the Pennsylvania Constitution.67 The
possible property rights arise from the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
to the United States Constitution and sections one and ten of Article I of
the Pennsylvania Constitution.68 Pennsylvania's takings and due process
clauses provide essentially the same property rights and protection as the

63. Sections 8621 and 8622 of Title 20 of the Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes
establish a trust fund to be used for organ donation education. 20 PA. CONS. STAT.
§§ 8621-8622 (2001). However, sections 8621 and 8622 do not specifically require
education about section 8641.
64. Under a presumed consent law, the current trust fund would be used for
educating the public on the presumed consent law and the ways to opt-out of the system.
See discussion infra Part III.D.
65. See Maryellen Liddy, Note, The "New Body Snatchers ": Analyzing the Effect of
Presumed Consent Organ Donation Laws on Privacy, Autonomy, and Liberty, 28
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 815 (2001) (discussing the possible constitutional rights and relevant
caselaw); Alexander Powhida, Comment, Forced Organ Donation: The Presumed
Consent to Organ Donation Laws of the Various States and the United States
Constitution, 9 ALB. L.J. Sci. & TECH. 349 (1999) (same).
66. See sources cited supra note 65.
67. The primary purpose of this comment is to compare presumed consent
legislation to the laws already existing in Pennsylvania, not to debate the existence of
constitutional rights. Therefore, only a very basic discussion of the possible rights and
differences of opinion as to those rights will be given in this section.
68. U.S. CONST. amend. V (stating that individuals shall not "be deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use, without just compensation"); U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (providing that no
state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law");
PA. CONST. art. 1, § I (protecting "certain inherent and indefeasible rights, among which
are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and
protecting property and reputation"); PA. CONST. art. 1, § 10 (stating that "private
property [shall not] be taken or applied to public use, without authority of law and
without just compensation being first made or secured").
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United States Constitution, and the rights secured by both will be treated
as the same for purposes of this comment. 69 The possible privacy rights
arise from several provisions of the United States Constitution as well as
section one of Article I of the Pennsylvania Constitution.70 The right to
privacy under the Pennsylvania Constitution includes the right to make
personal decisions free from governmental interference. 7 1 This right is
essentially the same as that established by the United States Constitution,
and the two will be treated as the same right for purposes of this
comment.7 2 With both the decedent and the decedent's next of kin
having possible property and privacy rights, a total of four constitutional
rights must be examined.73
1.

The Decedent's Property Right

One may argue that a decedent has a constitutionally protected
property right in his or her own body and organs after death.74 However,
in State v. Powell,75 the Florida Supreme Court held that the decedent did
not have a constitutionally protected property right in his corneas.76 The
court based its decision on the concept enunciated in Roe v. Wade 77 that
the Constitution protects only the rights of living persons.78 Although
organ donation requires a brain dead but breathing donor with a beating
heart (via machines) to ensure that oxygen is delivered to the organs,
under Pennsylvania law a person is considered dead upon the irreversible

69. See Pocono Pines Corp. v. Commonwealth Bd. of Prop., 310 A.2d 719, 721 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1973) (comparing the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's standard in Angle v.
Commonwealth, 153 A.2d 912 (Pa. 1959), to the United States Supreme Court's standard
in Schroeder v. City of New York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962)).
70. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973) (suggesting that the right to privacy
may arise from the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as the
penumbras of the Bill of Rights); see also PA. CONST. art. 1, § 1.
71. In re T.R., 731 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Pa. 1999).
72. See Fischer v. Dep't. of Pub. Welfare, 543 A.2d 177, 179 (Pa. Commw. Ct.
1988) (citing Roe in defining the right to privacy under the Pennsylvania Constitution).
73. See generally Silver, supra note 38; Erik S. Jaffe, Note, "She's Got Bette
Davis['s] Eyes ": Assessing the Nonconsensual Removal of Cadaver Organs Under the
Takings and Due Process Clauses, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 528 (1990).
74. See Moyer v. Moyer, 577 P.2d 108, 110 (Utah 1978) (stating that a decedent has
a right to make decisions during life regarding the disposal of his or her body after death).
75. 497 So. 2d 1188 (Fla. 1986).
76. Id. at 1190 (upholding the Florida partial presumed consent statute after
discussing and eliminating several possible constitutional rights). Neither the Florida
statute nor a presumed consent law requires a reasonable effort to contact the next of kin.
See FLA. STAT. ch. 732.9185 (2001). This differs from section 8641 of Title 20 of the
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes, which requires a reasonable effort to contact the next
of kin before corneas are presumed donated. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8641 (2001).
77. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
78. Powell, 497 So. 2d at 1190 (citing Roe, 410 U.S. at 157-59).
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cessation of all brain function. 79 Therefore, under Pennsylvania law the
decedent is not a living person with a constitutionally protected property
right.
If a court does hold that a decedent has a constitutionally protected
property right in his or her own body after death, caselaw suggests that a
proper due process procedure will protect this right. 80 A presumed
consent law can meet this requirement by providing individuals with
notice and education about the law plus several opportunities to avoid its
application. 81
With respect to just compensation concerns, requiring compensation
under a presumed consent law is impractical since federal and state
statutes prohibit the exchange of organs for compensation8 2 However,
under current Pennsylvania law decedents can receive an indirect benefit
for their organs similar to compensation. 83 These benefit provisions
would remain in place and supplement a presumed consent law.
Therefore, even if a constitutionally protected property right exists, it
appears that a presumed consent law would survive this constitutional
challenge.
2.

The Decedent's Privacy Right

It may also be argued that a decedent has a constitutionally
protected privacy right related to decisions over the disposition of his or
her own body and organs.8 4 However, in Powell, the Florida Supreme
Court held that the decedent did not have a constitutionally protected
privacy right linked to his corneas. 85 The court again based its decision
on Roe v. Wade's concept that the Constitution protects only the rights of
living persons. 86 The Michigan Court of Appeals reached the same

79. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10203 (West 2001); Liddy, supra note 65 at 846.
80. Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991); see also infra notes
113-15 and accompanying text (discussing due process requirements).
81. See supra note 50 (discussing several ways for the decedent to opt-out of
presumed consent organ donation); infra Part II.D (discussing the use of the trust fund
for education about and notice of the presumed consent law).
82. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (1994); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10203.
83. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8621-8622 (2001) (allowing a monetary benefit for
things such as the donor's hospital and funeral expenses).
84. See Liddy, supra note 65, at 846 (stating that organ procurement requires a brain
dead but breathing donor with a beating heart and, therefore, based on a state's definition
of death, a donor may be considered alive for constitutional purposes). But see PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 35, § 10203 (defining death as irreversible cessation of circulatory/respiratory
function or irreversible cessation of all brain function).
85. State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1190 (Fla. 1986) (upholding Florida's partial
presumed consent statute after discussing and eliminating several possible constitutional
rights).
86. Id. (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 157-59 (1973)).
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conclusion in Tillman v. Detroit Receiving Hospital,87 in which it held
that the decedent's fundamental right to privacy was not violated because
the constitutional right expired at the decedent's death. 88 Because it is
unlikely that a decedent has a constitutionally protected privacy right, a
presumed consent law would survive this constitutional challenge.
3.

The Next of Kin's Privacy Right

One may argue that a next of kin has a constitutionally protected
privacy right related to decisions over the decedent's body.8 9 However,
although this right is vested in a living person (the next of kin and not the
decedent), it is unlikely that the fundamental right to privacy extends
beyond the areas of child rearing, education, family, procreation,
contraception, or abortion. 90
The Florida Supreme Court in Powell and the Michigan Court of
Appeals in Tillman shared this view and refused to hold that the next of
kin had a constitutionally protected privacy right related to the
decedent's organs. 9' The Tillman court held that the decedent's privacy
right over his or her own body while alive did not pass to the estate or
next of kin upon death.92 Similarly, the Powell court held that the
constitutional right to privacy related only to personal matters in
relationships between living persons. 93 Both courts recognized a
possible state tort claim but refused to elevate that cause of action to a
constitutional privacy right.94 Therefore, it is unlikely that a next of kin
has a constitutionally protected privacy right in the decedent's organs.
Although no court has held that a constitutionally protected privacy
right exists in the next of kin, the dissenting justice in Powell argued that
the constitutional right to privacy should be extended to this situation.95

87. 360 N.W.2d 275 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
88. Id.at 277 (finding no constitutional right but suggesting that the next of kin may
have a cause of action for tortious interference with burial). The Michigan statute upheld
in Tillman is similar to the Florida statute upheld in Powell. Neither statute requires an

effort to contact the next of kin. See FLA. STAT. ch. 732.9185 (2001); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 333.10202 (2001). Although the decedent's claim in Tillman was grounded in a
Michigan constitutional right, the right originated from Roe v. Wade, similar to
Pennsylvania's privacy right. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text (discussing
Pennsylvania's right to privacy).
89. See Silver, supra note 38, at 716-17 (suggesting that a right to privacy may exist,
but that it is unlikely that courts would extend the fundamental privacy right to cover the
next ofkin's right in the decedent's body).
90. Id.
91. Powell, 497 So. 2d at 1193; Tillman, 360 N.W.2d at 277.
92. Tilhnan, 360 N.W.2d at 277.
93. Powell, 497 So. 2d at 1193.
94. Id.;
Tilman, 360 N.W.2d at 277.
95. Powell, 497 So. 2d at 1195-96 (Shawn, J., dissenting).
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However, he saw this right as limited by the state's police power to
regulate the disposition of dead bodies to protect health, safety, and
welfare.9 6 Therefore, even if a constitutionally protected privacy right
exists, it appears that a presumed consent law would survive this
constitutional challenge.
4.

The Next of Kin's Property Right

Lastly, one may argue that a next of kin has a constitutionally
protected property right in the decedent's body and organs.97 Courts
have deemed the next of kin's right in the decedent's body a quasiproperty right but differ on whether this property right is constitutionally
protected. 98
The Florida Supreme Court in Powell, the Georgia Supreme Court
in Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant,99 and the Michigan Court of
Appeals in Tillman all held that the next of kin's right in the decedent's
body does not rise to the level of a constitutionally protected property
right. 100 The Powell court recognized only a personal right to bury the
body, not a constitutionally protected property right. 10 Similarly, the
02
court in Georgia Lions recognized only a common law property right.1
In contrast to the state courts, the Sixth and Ninth Circuits have held

that a next of kin has a constitutionally protected property right in a
deceased relative's body.10 3 In the landmark federal case Brotherton v.
Cleveland,0 4 the Sixth Circuit found a constitutional property right based
on the aggregate of Ohio state law rights, such as the statutory right
conferred upon the next of kin to donate the decedent's organs and the
common law rights of the next of kin to dispose of the decedent's body
96. Id. (Shawn, J., dissenting).
97. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 305 (2001) (giving the next of kin the right to dispose
of the decedent's remains if the decedent failed to do so in a will); Jaffe, supra note 73, at
545 (suggesting that if an individual took the jawbone of Australopithecus Man from the
museum without permission the property term "theft" would be used without question).
98. Compare Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991) (holding that the
quasi-property right in a dead body rises to the level of a constitutionally protected right),
with Ga. Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 1985) (holding that the
next of kin's quasi-property right in the decedent's body does not rise to the level of a
constitutionally protected property right).
99. 335 S.E.2d 127 (Ga. 1985).
100. Powell, 497 So. 2d at 1192; Ga. Lions, 335 S.E.2d at 128; Tillman v. Detroit
Receiving Hosp., 360 N.W.2d 275, 277 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985).
101. Powell, 497 So. 2d at 1192.
102. Ga. Lions, 335 S.E.2d at 128. The Georgia partial presumed consent statute, like
the Florida and Michigan statutes, does not require a reasonable effort to contact the next
of kin. See GA. CODE. ANN. § 31-23-6 (1998).
103. Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 798 (9th Cir. 2002); Whaley v.
County of Tuscola, 58 F.3d 1111, 1116 (6th Cir. 1995); Brotherton, 923 F.2d at 482.
104. 923 F.2d 477 (6th Cir. 1991).
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and bring a claim for disturbance to the body. 10 5 Following the
Brotherton decision, the Sixth Circuit, in Whaley v. County of Tuscola,"°6
found a constitutional property right based on the aggregate of Michigan
state law rights. Similarly, in Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran,107 the Ninth
Circuit found a constitutional property right based on California state law
rights. 108
Pennsylvania recognizes the same types of next of kin rights as
Ohio, Michigan, and California. 109 Under a strong presumed consent
law, however, one such right-the next of kin's state law right to donate
the decedent's organs-would be eliminated. If the Pennsylvania
legislature adopted a presumed consent law, it would, in effect, be
choosing to extinguish the next of kin's state law right to donate the
decedent's organs. Therefore, this right could no longer serve as a
source for a constitutionally protected property right.
In addition, under Pennsylvania law the next of kin's right to
dispose of the decedent's body is not absolute. 10 A next of kin has a
right to dispose of the body only after the decedent has failed to choose
the method of disposal in his or her will." l ' Therefore, this right is, at
most, a "conditional" state law right and should not serve as the source of
a constitutionally protected property right. 1 2 Furthermore, under a
presumed consent law the decedent will always choose the method of
disposal for his or her organs by opting-out or accepting the default
donation, leaving no choice for the next of kin. As a result, it is unlikely
that a next of kin has a constitutional property right in a deceased
relative's organs.
If a property right in the next of kin does exist, a presumed consent
law could still survive a constitutional challenge. After holding that a
constitutionally protected property right existed, the court in Brotherton
suggested that the right would not be violated if a proper pre-deprivation
procedure existed. 1 3 The Brotherton court stopped short of suggesting
an appropriate procedure but mentioned the need for the next of kin to be
105. Id. at 482.
106. 58F.3d 1111, 1116 (6thCir. 1995).
107. 287 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2002).
108. Newman, 287 F.3d at 795-98; Whaley, 58 F.3d at 1116. But see Tillman v.
Detroit Receiving Hosp., 360 N.W.2d 275, 277 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that no
constitutional property right existed).
109. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 305 (2001) (giving the next of kin the right to dispose
of the decedent's body); id. § 8611 (giving the next of kin the right to donate the
decedent's organs).
110. Seeid.§305.
111. Id.
112. It is unclear whether the courts in Brotherton, Whaley, and Newman considered
the "conditional" nature of the state law rights.
113. Brotherton v. Cleveland, 923 F.2d 477, 482 (6th Cir. 1991).
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notified and given an opportunity to be heard." 4 Additionally, the
dissent in Georgia Lions suggested the need for the minimum due
process requirements of notice to the next of kin, a chance for the next of
kin to object, and compensation for the taking." 5
A presumed consent law can provide the appropriate predeprivation procedure. Sections 8621 and 8622 of Title 20 of the
Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes provide indirect "compensation" to
the next of kin." 16 This should be sufficient to satisfy the constitutional
requirement since direct compensation for organs is prohibited by federal
and state statutes.' 17 A presumed consent law will also ensure that the
public as a whole receives notice of the eventual taking, via publication
of the law and education programs. 18
Further, although a presumed consent law will not allow the next of
kin to be heard before the organs are taken or to object to the taking, due
process does not require notice and a hearing in every situation." 19 The
appropriate due process procedure depends on the particular
circumstances involved. 120 "Couple [the] rather minimal [property]
interest with the exigent circumstances surrounding and accompanying
the organ donation decision and the State's legitimate and compelling
interest in providing for and securing a future for the living,
and it
'2
becomes highly doubtful that much process is due plaintiff."' '
Several reasons exist for "excusing" the hearing and objection
requirements in this situation. Allowing the next of kin the opportunity
to be heard and object will defeat the purpose of adopting a strong form
of presumed consent, effectively re-creating the less successful weak
form that resembles the system presently used in Pennsylvania. 22 Also,
a presumed consent law gives the decedent the ultimate choice over his
or her organs and facilitates family discussions on organ donation while
all parties are alive. This could be liberally construed as a "hearing" and
a chance to "object." The next of kin is assumed to have every
114.

Id.

115. Ga. Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant, 335 S.E.2d 127, 129 (Ga. 1985) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
116. See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8621-8622 (allowing money from the trust fund to be
used for things such as the decedent's hospital and funeral expenses); see also discussion
infra Part III.D.
117. 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2001); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10025 (West 2001).

118. See infra Part I1I.D (discussing the education program that will supplement the
presumed consent law).
119. Mansaw v. Midwest Organ Bank, No. 97-0271-CV-W-6, 1998 WL 386327, at
*7 (W.D. Mo. July 8, 1998) (upholding the Missouri statute that required the consent of
only one parent to donate a deceased child's organs).
120.

See id.

121.

Id.at *8.

122.

See 20 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8611 (2001); Symposium, supra note 14, at 21-22.
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opportunity to speak to family members about his or her views on organ
donation and to influence the decedent's choice during the decedent's
lifetime. In the end, should not the decedent's informed choice as to his
or her own organs be respected over the next of kin's choice? Therefore,
even if a constitutionally protected property right exists, it appears that a
presumed consent law would survive this constitutional challenge.
D. PennsylvaniaHas Been a Pioneer in the Area of Pro-Organ
Donation Legislation in the Past
In 1994, Pennsylvania became a pioneer in the area of organ
donation by establishing the Governor Robert P. Casey Memorial Organ
and Tissue Donation Awareness Trust Fund ("Trust Fund") that serves as
A contribution of one dollar to the
a benefits system for organ donors.
Trust Fund is requested at each initial or renewal application for a
driver's license or vehicle registration. 24 Each year, ninety percent of
the fund may be expended for educational purposes such as promoting
organ donation awareness in the general public and in secondary
schools.125 The remaining ten percent can be used to pay hospital,
126
medical, funeral, and other expenses incurred by a vital organ donor.
Each donor can receive up to $3000 to compensate for expenses. 127 The
Trust Fund has not been challenged, despite its uniqueness, and other
states are following Pennsylvania's lead by adopting similar statutes. 128
The Trust Fund would not be eliminated with the adoption of a
presumed consent law. Instead, the Trust Fund would supplement the
presumed consent law by providing for educational programs that
123. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8621-8622; see Siegel, supra note 41, at 941-43
(discussing Pennsylvania's unique benefits system that rewards organ donors).
124. 20 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8621-8622.
125. Id.
126. Id. (defining "vital organ" as a heart, lung, kidney, pancreas, small bowel, large

bowel, or stomach).
127. Id. The most important federal statute affecting organ donation in Pennsylvania
directly relates to this incentive system. Section 274e prohibits the transfer of organs for
valuable consideration but excludes payments related to removal, transportation,
implantation, and preservation of the organ. See 42 U.S.C. § 274e (2001). Although
§ 274e applies only to organ purchases affecting interstate commerce, section 10025 of
Title 35 of the Pennsylvania Statutes prohibits the sale of organs within Pennsylvania.
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 10025 (West 2001). The Trust Fund has not been challenged
under either of these statutes. But see Siegel, supra note 41, at 942 (suggesting sections
8621 and 8622 may violate the federal statute prohibiting the sale of organs).
128. Siegel, supra note 41, at 942-43 (stating that, as of 2000, no state has followed
Pennsylvania by providing benefits to donors, but several states, such as Delaware,
Florida, and Ohio, have adopted education and awareness programs like those found
under Pennsylvania's Trust Fund statute). South Carolina has also adopted a trust fund
statute to be used for organ donation education. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-43-1310 (Law.
Co-op. 2001).

2003]

PRESUMED CONSENT ORGAN DONATION IN PENNSYLVANIA

951

promote awareness of the new organ donation law and by providing for
an indirect monetary benefit to donors and their next of kin. A presumed
consent law should be the next pro-organ donation statute pioneered by
Pennsylvania.
IV.

Conclusion: One Giant Leap for Organ Donation

Pennsylvania has a problem, and statistics suggest that presumed
consent organ donation could be the solution. A presumed consent law
is not a drastic shift for Pennsylvania; it is simply a small step from the
laws already in place. Neither the Pennsylvania nor the Federal
Constitution stands in the way, and Pennsylvania has been a pioneer in
the area of pro-organ donation legislation in the past. Therefore, the time
has come for Pennsylvania to take the initiative once again and help
those waiting for life-saving organs.
A presumed consent law offers several benefits that the current
organ donation system does not. Presumed consent will generate more
positive attitudes toward organ donation, since it will become the norm
rather than the exception. 129 It will ensure that donors know of the
presumed consent law, unlike the little-known section 8641. It will
provide donors with the absolute choice over their organs, unlike the
current system in which either an individual may wish to donate but the
donation does not occur because the next of kin refuses to consent or an
individual may not wish to donate but the donation does occur because
the next of kin consents or the individual meets the requirements of
section 8641. Most importantly, statistics suggest that a presumed
consent law will increase the number of available organs in
Pennsylvania. If other states follow Pennsylvania's lead and adopt
presumed consent legislation, thereby spreading these benefits across the
nation, Pennsylvania's small step will be a giant leap for organ
30
donation.

129. Some writers put a different spin on this statement by suggesting that presumed
consent laws exploit our disinclination to dissent. See, e.g., Silver, supra note 38, at 706.
130. A shift to a strong form of presumed consent will be easier for some states such
as California, Minnesota, Montana, and Texas since these states already presume that any
needed organs are donated (not just corneas and pituitary glands) after a failed effort to
contact the next of kin. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7151.6 (West 2001);
MINN. STAT. § 525.9213 (2001); MONT. CODE ANN. § 72-17-215 (2001); TEX. HEALTH &

SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 693.002 (Vernon 2001).

